China Bullet Trains Trip on Technology
1. Lightning continues to affect black box or switches box. As a result train services are disrupted for hours together. What back up mechanism can Indian Railway consider? Of course solutions exists.
2. Signaling designs are complex. According to people inside Indian Railways, Testing, Verification and Validation are still done manually in Indian Railways. Average person in the signaling deptt. has no clue how to interpret the design and test the interlocking applications. Any suggestions what formal signal design and V&V tools can Indian railways use?
Chairman Railway Board and Member Electrical should not play with the lives of the innocent Indian passengers. This is the best time to do audit of signaling systems, monitor the performance of vendors like Ansaldo, GE and rectify the situation. It is surprising why Minister for Railways and Chairman Railway Board are not taking immediate steps to set things right? Are we waiting for the next failure to happen?
SHANGHAI : China celebrated its bullet trains as the home-grown pride of a nation: a rail system faster and more advanced than any other, showcasing superior Chinese technology. However, China's high-speed rail network was in fact built with imported components—including signaling-system parts designed to prevent train collisions—that local engineers couldn't fully understand, according to a review of corporate documents and interviews with more than a dozen rail executives inside and outside China.During a late July lightning storm, two of China's bullet trains collided in the eastern city of Wenzhou, killing 40 people and injuring nearly 200 in one of the world's worst high-speed passenger-rail accidents. China's government initially blamed flawed signaling and human error. It recently postponed public release of its crash findings.
Take a look at how Hollysys Automation Technologies Ltd. became a key contractor for China's high-speed, rail-signaling system.
The precise cause of the disaster remains uncertain, so there is no way to know what role, if any, the signaling assembly may have played.
An examination of China's use of foreign technology in its bullet-train signal systems highlights deep international distrust over China's industrial model, including weak intellectual-property protections, which can complicate efforts to acquire state-of-the-art technology.
Key signaling systems were assembled by Beijing-based Hollysys Automation Technologies Ltd., one of the few companies China's Ministry of Railways tapped to handle such work. In some cases of the signal systems it supplied, technology branded as proprietary to Hollysys contained circuitry tailor-made by Hitachi Ltd. of Japan to Hollysys specifications, according to people familiar with the situation.
The problem, these people say, is that Hitachi—fearful that Chinese technicians might reverse-engineer and steal the technology—sold components with the inner workings concealed from Hollysys. Hitachi executives say this "black box" design makes gear harder to copy, and also harder to understand, for instance during testing. 
A rail signaling system is a complex assemblage of dozens of devices, circuits and software that helps train drivers and dispatchers keep everything running safely. As trains pass beacons along a route, known as "balise modules," information about location and speed are fed into the train-control network. According to Hollysys statements, it supplied key parts of the system including the onboard brain, the Automatic Train Protection, or ATP. Hitachi supplied Hollysys with a primary part of the ATP, according to Hitachi executives.
Hollysys didn't respond to requests for comment. Two days after the crash in July, Hollysys issued a statement confirming its ATP components were installed on both trains. Hollysys said its components "functioned normally and well."
A separate state-owned Chinese signaling company, which also works with foreign firms and supplies most of the gear to bullet-train projects, issued a statement around the same time expressing "sorrow" and pledging to accept its responsibility.
China's high-speed railway, budgeted at close to $300 billion, already challenges the travel time of jetliners between cities like Beijing and Shanghai, which are roughly as far apart as Philadelphia and Atlanta. The trains, with advertised cruising speeds on the fastest lines topping 215 miles per hour, are said to "fly on land," demonstrating a future where China is a recognized peer of the U.S., EU and Japan in big-ticket ingenuity. China is designing airliners to compete with Boeing Co. and nuclear reactors to challenge Toshiba Corp.'s Westinghouse Electric Co. It already exports high-speed rail equipment: This month it reached a deal to supply locomotives to the nation of Georgia.
In less than seven years, China has built a bullet-train network larger than the ones Japan and Germany took decades to construct. China is only about halfway through a 15-year plan to build a total of nearly 10,000 miles of high-speed track connecting 24 major cities.
"We aim at the world's top-notch technologies," then-Railways Minister Liu Zhijun declared four years ago. A few months before the July crash, Mr. Liu was fired after China's Communist Party accused him and other top officials of unspecified corruption. Mr. Liu couldn't be located for comment.
July's rail tragedy—in which two bullet trains collided during a storm, sending some cars plunging 65 feet from elevated tracks—is tarnishing China's effort to portray the project as technologically advanced and safety-minded. Among other things, the Ministry of Railways chose not to install lightning rods and surge protectors on some high-speed rail lines even as an industry association recommended doing so on major infrastructure projects, He Jinliang, director of China's National Lightning Protection Technology Standard Committee, said in July.
The Ministry of Railways didn't respond to requests for comment. Through state media and on its website, the ministry has stressed its attention to safety. A Sept. 5 statement said, "Our cadres should be leading the work, changing their style, going to the grass-roots level and trying to solve problems."
Last week, Chinese authorities reiterated their safety pledge after two subway trains in collided in Shanghai, injuring more than 280 people, in an accident blamed on errors after a power snafu knocked out signals, according to the subway operator.
From the initial days of the high-speed railway program, Beijing turned to local firms, including Hollysys, rather than foreign expertise. Hollysys says it is one of just two companies eligible to supply certain signaling technology for China's fastest trains. Ministry of Railways rules effectively forbid foreign companies from bidding.
Though new to high-speed rail, Hollysys became a central supplier of the signaling systems, circuits and software that are supposed to prevent the kind of accident that happened near Wenzhou by automatically stopping trains if trouble is detected.
Integrating signaling components is a challenge, particularly at the pace that China was expanding its rail network, train executives say. "The problem is to put all these pieces of the puzzle into a coherent system," says Marc Antoni, technological innovation director at SNCF, the French national railway operator, which runs the high-speed TGV.
Originally part of China's Ministry of Electronics, Hollysys in the 1990s became a privately owned business focused on "controls"—the technology that keeps factory assembly lines humming smoothly. In a Hollysys timeline of its railway achievements, the company says it won its first noteworthy high-speed-rail signaling contracts in 2005, about when China began construction.
A year later, in a filing with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, Hollysys played down the importance of high-speed-rail signaling by describing it as "adjacent" to core operations in industrial controls. The sector was mentioned just once in a 300-plus page SEC filing in 2006, part of a successful effort by Hollysys to list its shares on Nasdaq through a special-purpose acquisition company, or SPAC, a practice that involves adoption of a current listing by another company.
By late 2008 Beijing was speeding construction of its bullet trains in part to help power the Chinese economy through the global economic slump. Hollysys described itself in regulatory filings as one of just two companies that possessed "the capability" to supply the Ministry of Railways with signals on its fastest lines.
Hollysys became a tech darling and in September 2009 its chief financial officer, Peter Li, speaking to analysts, credited the Ministry of Railways' "very clear mandate of localizing the product." When an analyst asked whether he feared competition, Mr. Li said, "Basically, foreign players are not allowed to bid independently for high-speed-rail projects."
The Ministry of Railways awarded Hollysys more than $100 million of high-speed-signaling contracts in 2010 alone, according to company statements. For the fiscal year ended this past June, Hollysys reported total revenue of $262.84 million.
The ministry also played matchmaker for Hollysys. When a leading Italian signaling company, Ansaldo STS, sought a business foothold in China, the Ministry of Railways indicated that it should be in the form of a partnership with Hollysys, according to Ansaldo spokesman Roberto Alatri.
A $97 million contract followed in July 2008 for a Hollysys-Ansaldo consortium to design, build and maintain signal-control systems on China's then-fastest train line, a 459-kilometer section linking the central China cities of Zhengzhou and Xian. The Hollysys portion was $22 million.
Hollysys had a longer relationship with Hitachi, which supplied the Chinese company components for high-speed rail signaling starting in 2005, the year Hollysys says it got its start in the business. The main cooperation was on the onboard ATP system, which Hollysys documents describe as components in the nose and tail of trains that act as its "last line of defense in safety."
The Hitachi-made ATP components came with a catch. Two Hitachi executives familiar with the matter said the company adopts what the industry refers to as "black box" security to conceal design secrets by withholding technical blueprints known in Japanese as zumen.
Black boxes make it tough to reverse-engineer the equipment. They can also make it more difficult to troubleshoot the gear, according to executives of several companies familiar with the practice in China.
"Providing zumen means…we completely trust the buyer of our technology," a senior Hitachi executive said, with the understanding that the buyer "would not become a competitive threat in other markets."
Hitachi doesn't always withhold its design secrets. When working with companies elsewhere on a common project, the senior executive said, it will provide the zumen, or blueprints, in some cases.
Hitachi executives say the arrangement with Hollysys wasn't a technology-transfer deal—in which it would be expected to share technical details—but rather a contractual arrangement to manufacture parts to specifications provided by Hollysys. Hitachi says it did provide "limited" technical support that is typical of contracts of this type.
A spokesman at Hitachi's headquarters in Tokyo, Atsushi Konno, said the company "has no comment about Hollysys's products, as we do not have any information as to what kind of end product Hollysys developed using our devices." The official confirmed that Hitachi supplied Hollysys some equipment for the signaling systems used aboard trains and "also provided technical explanation regarding those components, and we believe Hollysys, as a result, fully understands them."
At least one installation of Hollysys components didn't go smoothly, according to one Europe-based engineer who worked on the job. An onboard Hollysys computer, part of the ATP called a driver machine interface, kept freezing, displaying old information.
Technical bugs aren't unusual when fine-tuning a train system, but the temporary fix was, according to the engineer. To avoid the embarrassment of canceling an opening ceremony, operators decided to begin passenger service on the high-speed line and assign one person in the train's cab the exclusive task of watching that the seconds continued to scroll on the computer's clock—thereby ensuring the device was functioning.
"It was a random failure that was not managed very well," the engineer said. The problem was later fixed, he said.
Dominique Pouliquen, head of Alstom SA's China operations, said China and its rail-equipment suppliers remain in the learning stages. "You acquire the technology. Then you need to absorb it; you need to master it," Mr. Pouliquen told a small group of reporters last week. For China, "I think it's all about absorption and fully mastering the whole technology that has been acquired over the last 10 years."
Alstom supplied, through a local joint venture, hardware for train dispatchers on the line where July's collision occurred. Mr. Pouliquen said the JV didn't provide any of the signaling technology that the Chinese government has said was possibly flawed.
In an August letter to shareholders, Hollysys Chief Executive Wang Changli cited the "tragic" Wenzhou accident and reiterated that Hollysys equipment wasn't to blame. China's biggest signaling company, Beijing-based China Railway Signal & Communication Corp., originated within China's railways bureaucracy. Shortly after the crash, a CRSC unit, Beijing National Railway Research & Design Institute of Signal and Communication, issued a statement of "sorrow" and pledged to "shoulder our responsibility."
CRSC hasn't commented about the accident directly, aside from a statement Aug. 23 stating that its top executive, 55-year-old Ma Cheng, collapsed and died during questioning by crash investigators.
Courtesy : The Wall Street Journal, Asia Edition.
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